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STUDENT WORKS
Copyright and the First Amendment
JEFFREY OAKES*
The author proposes a novel approach to the resolution of
conflicts between a copyright holder's interests and the public's
first amendment right to receive information of public interest
and concern. Rejection of customary balancing is advocated in
favor of a more workable and predictable method of dealing with
highly complex and potentially volatile conflicts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An objective examination of the copyright clause of the Consti-
tution' and the first amendment reveals an inherent conflict. A
copyright holder is given an exclusive property interest in an origi-
nal work he has created or produced, while the first amendment
includes certain guarantees-freedom of speech and freedom to
know or to hear. These first amendment guarantees could, arguably,
eliminate any rights bestowed by a copyright statute. Yet, the two
have coexisted with only minor conflict since the writing of the first
Copyright Act in 1790.2 The possibilities 6f a major conflict, how-
ever, increase with the expansion of first amendment doctrine.
This comment will examine the potential conflict in three
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."
2. Federal Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
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parts, beginning with a brief look at the Copyright Act of 1976 (the
Act):' which took effect on January 1, 1978. That section will review
the "fair use" doctrine and the statutory exemptions which offer
some first amendment protection. The second section will focus on
the first amendment, and a standard will be developed to enable
courts to resolve conflicts between copyright interests on the one
hand and first amendment concerns on the other. The final section
will compare this standard to the conventional approach in the
field.
The standard developed here is a novel one, especially in how
it deals with the situation where the copyright holder, through the
proprietary right afforded by the statute, limits access to matters
of public or general concern. Where there is such tension, the first
amendment rights of potential listeners, viewers and readers should
prevail. Prior cases support such an analytical framework, and it is
suggested that it is a more workable and equitable mode of dealing
with recurring conflicts in this area.
Copyright provides an important method of protecting a person
who has expended time and energy in creating a work and who is
justifiably entitled to all consequential benefits. Some form of copy-
right is unquestionably essential in order to protect writers, inven-
tors and artists, as well as to encourage creativity and to provide
economic incentive. The real question is: What constitutes an ac-
tionable copyright infringement? The first amendment defense for
an alleged infringer has not heretofore provided automatic protec-
tion. However, if a copyright owner attempts to monopolize or to
restrict access to certain materials of public interest through his
property right, then a claim of first amendment rights should offer
protection to a disseminator of the material. Since copyright and
the first amendment must ideally coexist, the central issue involves
a determination of the extent to which first amendment guarantees
erode the copyright holder's interests. That is, how strong is the
copyright holder's exclusive property right in the face of a first
amendment claim?
This comment will approach the problem of defining infringe-
ment through an application of Alexander Meiklejohn's "public
speech theory,"4 which has as its central concept free accessibility
of all information of public interest or concern.
3. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-710 (1977).
4. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM-THE CONSTITIONAL PowERs OF THE PEOPLE
(1948).
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II. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
After fifteen years of debate in Congress, the new Act5 finally
emerged as a much needed revision of the antiquated Copyright Act
of 1909.6 Technological advances in both communications and cop-
ying had rendered the 1909 law obsolete.
For the purposes of this comment, sections 107 through 118 of
the new law are the most relevant. Section 107 codifies, for the first
time, the fair use doctrine,' while sections 108 through 118 provide
exemptions for uses of material that would be otherwise protected
under section 106.8 Taken together, these exemptions and the fair
use doctrine make protected information more accessible. In a
sense, these provisions safeguard against the copyright holder's
monopolistic property rights.
In Mazer v. Stein,' the Supreme Court of the United States
perceived an economic undercurrent in the copyright clause of the
Constitution: "The economic philosophy behind the clause empow-
ering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talent of authors and inven-
tors in 'Science and useful Arts."' 0 The authorization to grant a
limited monopoly is predicated upon two premises: (1) that the
public benefits from the creative activities of authors; and (2) that
the copyright monopoly is necessary to the realization of such activi-
5. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, tit. I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (amending 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)).
6. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
7. The fair use doctrine permits an author to use the copyrighted work of another without
first obtaining permission and without infringing the copyright. For the factors to be consid-
ered in a determination of fair use, see note 20 and accompanying text infra.
8. Section 106 provides:
Subject to sections 107 to 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or binding;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1977). For a summary of §§ 108-18, see note 32 and accompanying text
infra.
9. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
10. Id. at 219.
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ties. "Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that in the absence
of such public benefit the grant of a copyright monopoly to individu-
als would be unjustified."" The Court also noted in Mazer that
reward to the owner was a secondary consideration. 2 Therefore,
within the Act itself there is a subtle conflict between two interests
or social policies. One favors the broad dissemination of ideas and
new forms of expression, while the second gives the authors and
writers a sufficient monopoly to ensure rewards for their efforts. 3
The courts recognize two essential principles before copyright
protection is afforded. First, the manner in which ideas or themes
are expressed is protected, while the actual ideas, themes or char-
acters are not." Second, copyright only protects material originally
conceived by the copyright holder. 5 These concepts have been ex-
plicitly incorporated into the new Act." Should a work have these
characteristics, the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to
authorize reproduction of the copyrighted work, prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work, distribute copies or phono-
records of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other trans-
fer of ownership, and in certain instances to perform and to display
the copyrighted work publicly." These exclusive rights are subject
to the fair use doctrine and exemptions embodied in sections 107 to
118 of the Act.
11. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A], at 1-29 (1978).
12. 347 U.S. at 219.
13. See United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
14. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 217; Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 612
(2d Cir. 1945); Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp. 877, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Gethers v. Blatty, 283 F. Supp. 303, 305 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
15. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. at 217; Fuld v. National Broadcasting Co., 390 F. Supp.
877, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
16. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (1977). Section 102 of the Act defines the subject matter of copy-
right as follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of
authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audio visual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated or embodied in such work.
17. Id.
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In essence, fair use and other exemptions set forth in the new
statute provide some limitations on what would otherwise be an
exclusive right. In certain instances their scope of protection is too
limited and in those situations a first amendment defense is needed.
To understand better the need for such a defense, a brief discussion
of fair use and the new exemptions is necessary.
A. Fair Use
As defined vaguely in the Copyright Act of 1976, the fair use
doctrine is derived from an extensive body of law'8 that was scruti-
nized closely by the draftsmen of the Act.' The factors determina-
tive of fair use are:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work."0
The intent of such general language is to keep the doctrine flexible
and to allow courts to decide situations on a case by case basis.,'
Fair use is at the heart of the copyright scheme and balances
two opposing interests: one which encourages access and the other
which maximizes financial gain. Generally, the courts seem to agree
that the purpose of the doctrine is to "subordinate the copyright
holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater pub-
lic interest in the development of art, science and industry."'22 They
differ, however, in defining precisely the standard for determining
fair use in each particular case.
Literary criticism is the most widely recognized application of
the fair use doctrine. This use is recognized by the statute, along
with such other forms as commentary-news reporting, teaching
18. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d
Cir. 1977); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
20. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 5659, 5680.
22. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Meeropol v. Nizer, 417
F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), modified, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
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(multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship and research. 3
These represent some of the simpler situations in which the doctrine
is invoked. In designating these areas, Congress must have consid-
ered them protected due to public interest. If the Congress has
mandated, for the purpose of the above uses, that the copyright
holder's interest must be subordinated to the public's interest, some
elements of the first amendment are necessarily intertwined with
the doctrine of fair use.2" The doctrine, however, is too limited in
scope and predictability to determine consistently the nature of this
interaction. Melville Nimmer, one of the leading scholars in the
copyright field, argues that fair use decisions can be explained best
by looking to the central question of whether a defendant's use tends
to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the plaintiff's work.
Regardless of the medium, so long as defendant's material performs
a different function than that of plaintiff's, it may contain substan-
tially similar material, and the fair use defense may be invoked. The
general principle is that the scope of fair use is restricted to situa-
tions where the two works in issue fulfill the same function in terms
of actual or potential consumer demand.25 Nimmer does not con-
sider the public interest aspect of the doctrine. Rather, he chooses
to place his emphasis on the author's economic incentives and the
protection of the copyright structure."
Leon Seltzer,27 in an extensive article discussing fair use and the
exemptions in the new statute," approaches fair use in a fashion
23. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977).
24. See Rosenfeld, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 790 (1975).
25. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.05[B], at 13-58.
26. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420
U.S. 376 (1975) (libraries' copying and distributing of journal and magazine articles was
considered fair use). For criticism of this case, see 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, §
13.051E[41[c], at 13-73 to -81. Nimmer's standard of fair use makes understandable his
criticism of Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
Random House had published a biography of Howard Hughes that incorporated large por-
tions of copyrighted articles printed in Look magazine ten years before. Rosemont, who had
purchased the copyrights, attempted to prevent publication of the book, claiming copyright
infringement. The court decided that this was fair use because of a need for public dissemina-
tion of information since, it reasoned, Hughes was a public figure. Nimmer felt this was
undermining the copyright system, since both works went essentially to the same function.
The case's first amendment language further disturbed Nimmer. That aspect will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in section IV infra.
27. Leon Seltzer is director of the Stanford University Press and a member of the Califor-
nia bar.
28. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions
in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL. COPYRIOHT Soc'v 215 (1976-77). Seltzer criticizes the
statutory treatment from three approaches: (1) it makes no effort to define fair use; (2) it
does not provide guidelines for ordering the four factors; and (3) by creating exemptions (e.g.,
[Vol. 33:207
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similar to Nimmer. He argues that the fourth statutory factor, the
extent of the effect of use upon the potential market for the copy-
right, should be the first factor considered in determining fair use.
Any analysis of fair use, according to Seltzer, should start from the
author's perspective.
He proposes that a more useful statute would read: "Fair use
is use that is necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, literature,
and the arts AND does not deprive the creator of the work of an
appropriately expected economic reward."29 This approach suggests
balancing the factor of access against the general copyright interests
of encouraging creativity by offering substantial economic incen-
tives.
Seltzer supports his proposition by developing a dual perspec-
tive framework of "normal expectations." Authors and society en-
trust their interests to the copyright scheme, taking a risk that the
costs to each will not be unbearable. Their dual risks are posed by
two questions:
Is this use within the risk the author was taking that he
would not be paid? Is this use within the risk society was taking
that the author would assert control of access? Since both ques-
tions turn on the appropriate expectations of each, the determi-
nation of fair use in a particular instance will decide whether the
author's expectation of economic reward was or was not appropri-
ate, and such a determination ought to coincide with a simulta-
neous judgment about whether society's expectation of denial of
access was or was not appropriate.'
Seltzer's test requires a substantial balancing of interests to deter-
mine fair use, with the weight being placed on economic incentive
for the author. Seltzer argues that this dual-risk approach should
enable the courts to handle any conceivable situation."
teaching and research), it blurs the distinction between fair use and the exemptions. Id. at
231.
29. Id. at 243.
30. Id. at 242. Courts will permit a second author to make use of a prior author's research.
See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Greenbie
v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
31. Seltzer argues that the dual-risk approach would encompass reasonable free speech
considerations. Nimmer deals with Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (whether the use of frames from the Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassina-
tion in a book was fair use), and Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1966), in his discussion of the first amendment and copyright. See Nimmer, Does
Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 1180 (1970). Seltzer does not see the need to pose an adversary relationship between
the first amendment and fair use. Application of the fair use test of "appropriately expected
economic reward," modified by the necessity of access test, would provide for the free speech
considerations, would reach the same result as in Bernard Geis and would not require the
1978]
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In most situations the copyright holder could argue that any use
of his material, no matter how far in the future, will deprive him of
certain economic gains. The question thus becomes: How long can
one retain the copyright and deny access to information? If one
examines the question from Seltzer's view, looking at the author's
economic expectation, the balance would certainly favor the copy-
right holder. Nimmer's standard would have the same result-no
matter how far in the future the use takes place, if both works
perform the same function, there is definite economic harm. It is
difficult to predict what result would be reached under the statute.
When one analyzes this problem under the four statutory factors of
the Act, the result is less obvious.
Because of the indefiniteness of the statute and the countervail-
ing factor of the author's economic concerns, it is difficult to predict
when one may use another's work. Though a useful tool, fair use in
no way allows an individual to exercise his first amendment rights
by making more accessible to the public copyrighted material.
B. Other Statutory Exemptions
With fair use, the concern is in predicting how the courts will
determine the line between protected uses and a use that is not
permitted by the copyright statute. The other statutory exemptions
concern uses that, although fully protected by copyright, are exempt
from the copyright control of the author for reasons of public policy
as determined by Congress. Congress, in sections 108 through 118
of the new statute, has taken control of access away from the author
for two reasons: (1) a competing constitutional interest requires that
a particular use of the work should be free of cost; or (2) a competing
constitutional interest requires that access not be restricted except
for cost. 2
use of the first amendment. Seltzer agrees with Nimmer that the copying of the Look articles
involved in Rosemont could not be justified on either first amendment or fair use grounds.
Seltzer argues that the fair use issue was never squarely faced and that his dual-risk approach
would help ferret out the real fair use issues.
32. For the purposes of this comment it is only necessary to describe briefly the exemp-
tion provisions under the new statute. Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 108 (1977), a library or archives
may reproduce "no more than one copy" and distribute it if: (1) there is no direct or indirect
commercial advantage; (2) the library collections are open to the public; and (3) the reproduc-
tion includes a notice of copyright. There are other qualifying provisions within § 108, which
basically exempt the limited use of copyrighted material from copyright infringement. Sec-
tion 109 permits the owner of a copyrighted work to sell or dispose of it and to display the
copy publicly without the authority of the copyright holder. Section 110 exempts certain
performances and displays of dramatic or nondramatic literary or musical works from copy-
right infringement. They are exempt when used for educational purposes, performed in the
course of religious worship or other religious assembly, performed for the public without any
[Vol. 33:207
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A cursory examination of sections 107 through 118 reveals that,
although the sections do not seriously diminish the copyright hold-
ers' monopoly rights, information and materials are now more acces-
sible to the public. The inclusion of the exemptions in the new
statute demonstrates the congressional awareness of the problem
that developed as technology rapidly expanded. The exemptions,
some providing access without cost and others guaranteeing access
by license, however, are not sufficiently broad to provide the guar-
antees that are essential in situations where the first amendment
conflicts with a copyright. As with fair use, the exemptions offer
some protection, albeit inadequate, of first amendment rights.
There is an essential need for a standard to measure conflicts
between copyright on the one hand and the first amendment on the
other. The next two sections of this comment will attempt to de-
velop such a standard.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Alexander Meiklejohn 33 argues that free speech is protected
under the first amendment as an essential element of intelligent
self-government in a democratic system. It is recognized, however,
that this is a narrow interpretative view, and is not necessarily a
purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage and in other circumscribed areas. Under
§ 111, certain secondary transmissions are exempted totally, while others are now subject to
a compulsory license. Section 112 permits a transmitting organization to make one copy of a,
particular transmission program and retransmit it for up to six months in its own broadcast-
ing area. It permits a governmental body or nonprofit organization to make 30 copies of a
performance, so long as all but one, for archival purposes, is destroyed after seven years.
Section 112 also permits the reproduction for distribution of one copy of a nondramatic
musical work of a religious nature. In addition, it allows governmental bodies or nonprofit
organizations entitled to transmit performances the right to make 10 copies for their own use.
Section 113 largely adopts the basic principle of Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (copy-
right in a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work will not be affected if the work is employed as
the design of a useful article and there is protection for the copyright owner against unauthor-
ized reproduction). However, § 113 permits the use of displays or pictures in connection with
advertisements or commentaries related to distribution of the product. Section 114 gives
exclusive rights of a sound recording, as described in § .106, to the copyright holder. Section
115 makes the exclusive rights provided by §§ 106(1) and (3) subject to compulsory licens-
ing. Any person may, by complying with the provisions of this section, obtain a compulsory
license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work. Section 116 limits the exclusive
right of public performance under § 106(4) by permitting the operation of coin operated rec-
ord players. The operator must: (1) obtain a compulsory license by filing an application; (2)
affix a certificate issued by the Register of Copyrights; and (3) pay royalties. Section 117
deals with the rights of copyright holders and information stored in computers. Section 118
makes more accessible certain works for public broadcasting upon the payment of a reason-
able royalty.
33. Alexander Meiklejohn, although not a lawyer, was one of the leading figures in the
area of first amendment theory. He first presented his theory on free speech and its relation
to self-government at the University of Chicago, and later presented it at the law schools of
Yale University and St. John's College.
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viable theory in all first amendment situations. Professor Tribe re-
sponds aptly in his new treatise:
This Theory would limit the special guarantees of the first
amendment to public discussion of issues of civic importance; in
exchange for offering supposedly "absolute" protection to a polit-
ical category of discourse, the theory would relegate to only mini-
mal due process protection everything outside that category.
When critics respond that the "public issues" category is ob-
viously far too narrow unless it becomes almost infinitely expand-
able, the theory-in the hands of all but its truest believ-
ers-obligingly expands to encompass "novels and dramas and
paintings and poems," as well as even commercial information,
insofar as all of these may indirectly contribute to the sophistica-
tion and wisdom of the electorate. Yet when the theory has been
thus expanded, it tells us disappointingly little. Indeed in none
of its forms does it tell us a great deal, since it takes for granted
the virtues of the self-governance to which it argues that free
speech is so necessary.'
Furthermore, Judge William Hastie wrote of Meiklejohn's theory:
The results of such a reading of the free speech clause would
be twofold. It would limit the area of applicability and at the
same time strengthen the protection afforded within the defined
area. It would preclude the judicial freewheeling that at times
characterizes our application of an explicit and unqualified con-
stitutional prohibition."
Despite this criticism, 3 it is the perfect first amendment inter-
34. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 577-78 (1978) (emphasis in original).
35. Hastie, Free Speech: Contrasting Constitutional Concepts and their Consequences,
9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 428, 434 (1974).
36. Other theories of the first amendment give credence to Meiklejohn's theory. See T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966). Emerson devel-
opes his theory in the first chapter: "The Function of Freedom of Expression in a Democratic
Society." There are four categories into which Emerson groups the reasons for protecting
freedom of expression:
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as a method of assur-
ing individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a
method of securing participation by the members of the society in social, includ-
ing political, decision-making, and (4) as the means of maintaining the balance
between stability and change in the society.
Id. at 3.
Emerson's first value of freedom of expression is justified as the right of an individual by
reason of his capacity as an individual. This means that man has a right to develop his mind
and formulate opinions. "From these concepts there follows the right of the individual to
access to knowledge; to shape his own views; to communicate his needs, preferences and
judgments; in short, to participate in formulating the aims and achievements of his society
and state." Id. at 5-6. The core of Meiklejohn's theory is the notion of access and its vitality
in a self-governing system. He argues more persuasively that all ideas should be available.
[Vol. 33:207
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pretation to apply to copyright. It allows first amendment rights to
be protected, while at the same time preserving copyright interests.
Some of the questions not covered by this approach will find protec-
tion in the new copyright statute, and with the doctrine of fair use
together with the exemptions,37 many areas of alleged infringement
will not need first amendment protection.
Since the public speech theory provides the best test for copy-
right infringements and first amendment claims, it is necessary to
define Meiklejohn's thesis in greater detail.
A. Meilkejohn's Theory
Meiklejohn places his faith in the people and argues that the
essence of the Constitution is its authors' underlying philosophy of
a politically free society-the belief in self-government. 8 Within
such a self-governing process there will be times when freedom will
be restricted, but that is an inevitable byproduct of social life.
At the bottom of every plan of self-government is a basic agree-
ment, in which all citizens have joined, that all matters of public
policy shall be decided by corporate action, that such decisions
shall be equally binding on all citizens, whether they agree with
Emerson's second value is the "Attainment of Truth," which supports Meiklejohn's
philosophical framework and the basic idea of making information available:
The theory starts with the premise that the soundest and most rational judgment
is arrived at by considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth in
behalf of or against any proposition . . . . [An individual] must consider all
alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, make full use of
different minds to sift the true from the false. Conversely, suppression of informa-
tion, discussion, or the clash of opinion prevents one from reaching the most
rational judgment, blocks the generation of new ideas, and tends to perpetuate
error. This is the method of the Socratic dialogue employed on a universal scale.
Id. at 7.
Emerson's third main function of freedom of expression is to provide for participation in
decisionmaking. "In order for the process to operate at its best, every relevant fact must be
brought out, every opinion and every insight must be available for consideration." Id. at 9.
Emerson notes that freedom of expression has particular significance in political activity. The
basic theory, however, goes beyond and includes freedom of expression in religion, literature,
art, science and all areas of human learning and knowledge. It is indispensable to the opera-
tion of the democratic form of government.
This supports Meiklejohn's theory, since it recognizes the importance of expression to
the self-governing process. All ideas must be available for consideration-there should be no
limitation on the access of ideas or opinions.
The availability of material lends itself to open discussion, which in turn provides for
stability, Emerson's fourth tenet. Meiklejohn places his faith in the people-the final deci-
sionmakers. Both Emerson and he would argue that freedom of expression lies at the core of
the democratic society. But see Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521, 554-567 (1977).
37. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-12 (1977).
38. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 9.
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them or not, and that, if need be, they shall, by due legal proce-
dure, be enforced upon anyone who refuses to conform to them. 9
The heart of Meiklejohn's theory is that the American form of gov-
ernment rests upon a "compact"4 that the people of the United
States are to be self-governed and that everything else is subservient
to this underlying philosophy. The citizens of this nation shall make
and obey their own laws; they shall be their own subjects and their
own masters. Meiklejohn concludes his theoretical framework by
noting:
It is ordained that all authority to exercise control, to determine
common action, belongs to "We, the People." We, and we alone,
are the rulers. But it is ordained also that We, the People, are,
all alike, subject to control. Everyone of us may be told what he
is allowed to do, what he is not allowed to do, what he is required
to do. . . . Control by a self-governing nation is utterly different
in kind from control by an irresponsible despotism. And to con-
fuse these two is to lose all understanding of what political free-
dom is. Under actual conditions, there is no freedom for men
except by the authority of government. Free men are not non-
governed. They are governed-by themselves.4
The first amendment has an essential role in the self-governing
system. It reads: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."' 2 Though considered an absolute right, it does not pre-
clude the imposition of reasonable restrictions on one's freedom by
the government. 3
With this method of self-government, the point of ultimate
interest is not the words of the speakers; rather, it is the minds of
the hearers. The idea of access to ideas is at the core of the public
speech theory. "That is why freedom of discussion for those minds
may not be abridged.""
The essence of Meiklejohn's argument is that no speaker should
be barred from speaking because his views may be false or danger-
ous. All ideas should be available to the populace.
39. Id. at 14.
40. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
41. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4, at 18-19.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43. The paradox is that the first amendment "does not forbid the abridging of speech.
But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech. " A. MMKLEJOHN,
supra note 4, at 21 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 26.
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When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one
else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness
and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hear-
ing as well as wise ones, unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well
as safe, un-American as well as American .... The principle of
the freedom of speech springs from the necessities of the program
of self-government . . . .It is a deduction from the basic Ameri-
can agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal
suffrage.'
The freedom to express all ideas should not be abridged.
Meiklejohn's great faith in self-government rests upon the edu-
cation of the masses. Only through access to free information may
the governors govern. The first amendment is intended to offer this
type of protection. Under the public speech theory, the critical ques-
tion is whether a given utterance contributes to public communica-
tion rather than whether the end it serves may outweigh other val-
ues or objectives of the body politic. The first amendment is con-
strued as a charter of universal and equal participation in self-
government." Thus, the questions that have to be asked are how is
"speech" to be identified in contrast to other utterances not entitled
to protection, and how is "public" to be defined. These questions
are important not only in their relationship to the public speech
theory as a whole but in how the theory should be applied to copy-
right.
Donald Meiklejohn answers those questions in his article on
public speech:
The answer to the first question requires distinguishing be-
tween "speech" as the free communication of ideas and "actions"
amounting to coercion or manipulation incompatible with the
unfettered formation of public opinion. The answer to the second
question requires distinguishing between events the knowledge of
which contribute to the formation of public opinion necessary to
effective self-government and those events which are circum-
scribed by a "privacy area into which the public can claim no
need to intrude."'' 7
In other words, the public speech theory is concerned only with
speech that relays important and meaningful information to the
public. The first amendment provides absolute protection to the
45. Id. at 27.
46. Meiklejohn, Public Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v. Sullivan,
26 SYRACUSE L. REv. 819 (1977).
47. Id. at 829. Donald Meiklejohn is Alexander Meiklejohn's son, and a professor emeri-
tus at Syracuse University.
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-free flow of ideas, regardless of their form, though it will condemn
actions which are coercive. It also provides for absolute protection
of all events that are essential to the functioning of a self-governing
democracy while offering to protect those areas that are private or
essential.
Meiklejohn derived the entire meaning of the free speech clause
from the scheme of self-government written into the Constitution.
His sense of governing did not limit speech to purely political utter-
ances, but extended freedom of speech to literature, the arts and
philosophy. 8 At the far reaches of his theory was the idea that
novels, drama, poetry and painting are essential to self-government
since they expose people to new ideas and stimulate their thinking.
There must be total access to all ideas, ranging from purely political
to merely entertaining. Thus, the government cannot prevent access
by imposing forms of censorship or cutting off modes of communica-
tion."
Novels, drama, poetry and painting were characterized as hav-
ing "governing importance." Meiklejohn's view, however, was not
that the government had no role in restricting freedom of expression
and that the first amendment offered absolute protection. He found
no fault with laws and ordinances that required the speaker to con-
form to the necessities of the community with respect to time, place,
circumstances and manner of procedure, so long as these were not
used merely as a pretext for attempts to suppress speech which
would otherwise be appropriate." There is no contention that the
copyright law falls into such a category. If, however, an author or
composer should attempt to "suppress speech" through the use of
his copyright or property right, he runs afoul of the first amend-
ment. The use of such copyrighted material should not be consid-
ered an infringement; rather, it should be protected by the first
amendment.
B. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Beyond
Acceptance of the "public speech theory" by the courts as a
viable theory of interpreting first amendment rights has grown in
48. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, [1961] SuP. CT. REv. 245, 262.
49. This is not to suggest that copyright cuts off communication, though potentially it
could. If the government were to give a property right to an author, who then would control
the work, that property right would not prevent dissemination of materials unless the holder
of such a right attempted to block the spread of ideas. In this situation there would be a
conflict, and where access is hindered, the first amendment should offer protection for any
infringement.
50. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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the past fifteen years. Beginning with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,5' and followed by its progeny and the commercial advertis-
ing cases, there is sufficient case law to indicate that the courts
would support a standard that used such a first amendment inter-
pretation. This section discusses existing case law that supports the
Meiklejohn interpretation in developing the standard to be applied
when the first amendment and copyright protection clash.
In two landmark decisions, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan"
and Garrison v. Louisiana,53 the Supreme Court of the United States
adopted Meiklejohn's first amendment approach. Justice Brennan
51. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Id. Respondent Sullivan brought suit against four black Alabama clergymen and the
New York Times Co. for libelous statements printed in a full page advertisement carried in
The New York Times. The advertisement was a plea for funds to aid the civil rights move-
ment in the South. The ad described certain events to indicate the hardships that blacks in
the South were confronted with, but it only indirectly referred to the respondent. A jury,
under instructions that the statements in the advertisement were libelous per se if the jury
found that the petitioners had published such an ad and that the statements made concerned
the respondent, returned a verdict for respondent of $500,000, the full amount requested.
The background of the Sullivan case lay in the general recognition, at common law, of a
qualified privilege in defamation actions of "fair comment" upon the conduct and qualifica-
tions of public officers and public employees. This was a broad privilege that extended to
publication to the public of a matter of public concern. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW
OF ToRTs 819 (4th ed. 1971).
The common law privilege of "fair comment" in public discussion was not limited to
officials and candidates. It also extended to other matters of public concern. See, e.g., Ken-
nedy v. Item Co., 197 La. 1050, 3 So. 2d 175 (1941); Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254
N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139, 237 N.Y.S. 123 (1930) (Cardozo, J.) (criticism of high school football
coach held fair comment because of keen interest in high school sports); Holway v. World
Publishing Co., 171 Okla. 306, 44 P.2d 881 (1935) (consulting engineer for city water supply
held subject of fair comment); Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d
837 (1943) (official's conduct in distribution of public funds held subject of fair comment);
Grell v. Hoard, 206 Wis. 187, 239 N.W. 428 (1931) (highway commissioner held subject of fair
comment); Spriggs v. Cheyenne Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947) (general public
held entitled to be aware of an attorney's involvement in disbarment proceedings); see Beau-
harnais v. Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., 243 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1957) (plaintiff promoted
racial hatred and was involved in the Cicero riots, which were of great public interest);
Flanagan v. Nicholson Publishing Co., 137 La. 588, 68 So. 964 (1915) (newspaper published
an article about the plaintiff, a vice president of an international labor union, who used his
influence to assist San Francisco in getting the World's Fair over New Orleans. The court
held that the privilege rested on two grounds: (1) it was within the province of the newspaper
to comment on the incident as a matter of news and of general public interest; (2) plaintiffs
public role in Washington made him a public figure subject to such attack, condemnation
and ridicule as is appropriate and necessary in a campaign where public opinion is sought to
be molded.); Duffy v. New York Evening Post Co., 109 App. Div. 471, 96 N.Y.S. 629 (1905)
(newspaper article criticized individual in his role as a political leader). See also Comment,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 419 (1967); Note, 17 HASTINOs L.J. 346 (1965); Note, 20 RUras L. Rxv.
390 (1966).
53. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Garrison involved a state criminal libel statute. Appellant, the
district attorney, made disparaging statements about the judicial conduct of the criminal
district courts. Appellant was tried without a jury before a judge and convicted of criminal
defamation.
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wrote both opinions and began Sullivan by writing: "We are re-
quired in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which
the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state's
power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct."5
The underlying rationale of both opinions, approved unani-
mously, was that by imposing sanctions against the libelee, the
state had violated the free speech clause of the Constitution." The
imposition of sanctions for such conduct resulted in the imposition
of restrictions which went to the heart of the principle of self-
government. In Garrison, Justice Brennan observed:
[Slpeech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government. The First and Fourteenth
Amendments embody our "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on govern-
ment and public officials.""
The court quoted the attack by Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison against the Sedition Act of 1798.11 Their premise was that
the "Constitution created a form of government under which 'the
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.""'
The Court also pointed to a statement made by James Madison in
the House of Representatives: "If we advert to the nature of Repub-
lican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the
people over the Government and not in the Government over the
people."" Finally, the Court concluded that the "right of free public
discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madi-
son's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of govern-
ment." 0
The thrust of the Court's decisions in Sullivan and Garrison,
with their bold recognition of the public speech theory, is to guaran-
tee that ideas and thoughts can be freely published and, therefore,
more accessible. The Court noted that the Sedition Act, which re-
54. 376 U.S. at 256.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. 379 U.S. at 74-75 (quoting in part New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
57. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596. The Act, popularly known as the Alien and Sedition
Acts, expired by its terms in 1801 before the Supreme Court could rule on its constitution-
ality. It was widely believed, in any event, that the law was unconstitutional. See New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
58. Id. at 274.
59. Id. at 275.
60. Id.
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strained criticism of government and public officials, was inconsist-
ent with the first amendment, and that the guarantee of self-
government required that no government sanctions be imposed on
speaking or hearing.
Although extending the public speech doctrine, the Court has
not adopted it as its singular method for handling first amendment
problems. The most recent commercial advertising cases,"' however,
have accepted the public speech theory. These cases, together with
those that followed Sullivan, indicate that the Court might be
amenable to applying this theory when confronted with a copy-
right and first amendment problem.
Sullivan and Garrison speak to the first step in the test sug-
gested herein-access. The second part of the test is the definition
of what should be considered matters of public concern. The Su-
preme Court first considered the relationship of the first amend-
ment to matters of public concern in Thornhill v. Alabama,2
wherein Justice Murphy wrote: "The freedom of speech and of
the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public con-
cern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.""
The problem, ultimately, is in distinguishing public from private
concerns-precisely the issue confronted by the progeny of Sullivan.
Time, Inc. v. Hill4 illustrates the difficulty in dealing with this
problem. James Hill and his family were held hostage for nineteen
hours by three escaped convicts. They escaped unharmed and there-
after Hill attempted to avoid publicity. Six months later Joseph
Hayes' novel, The Desperate Hours, based in part on the Hill story,
was published and was subsequently made into a play. Life maga-
zine then ran a story on the play with pictures of the Hill home and
suggestions that the book was about the Hill family ordeal. Hill sued
the publishers for false reporting. Life's defense was that the article
was a matter of legitimate public interest. The New York courts
ruled against Life. The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four
decision that indicated the Court's inability to define precisely the
public-private dichotomy.
Justice Brennan, in the opinion of the Court, rationalized that
open debate and discussion, though not political expression or com-
61. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975); text accompanying notes 84-
94 infra.
62. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
63. Id. at 101-02.
64. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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ment upon public affairs, still required first amendment protec-
tion."5 Justice Brennan had no trouble finding that the opening of a
new play, based in part on an actual incident, was a matter of public
interest. Justice Douglas concurred and pointed out that the mem-
bers of the Hill family had no control over the events; rather, he
noted, they were catapulted into the news. As a result, their activi-
ties became part of the public domain, and where the discussion
concerns matters in the public domain, action to abridge freedom
of the press is barred by the first amendment.
Justice Harlan took a narrower view of the concept of "public."
He argued that "where private actions are involved the social inter-
est in individual protection from falsity may be substantial.""6 He
did not see the "market place of ideas" functioning here as in
Sullivan, where the public had an "independent interest in the
qualifications and performance" of those who held government posi-
tions." Hill had not voluntarily entered the public's attention and
had no means of effective reply. Justice Harlan would have re-
manded for retrial.
Justice Fortas, in his dissent with the Chief Justice and Justice
Clark, thought the majority opinion ignored the fundamental right
to privacy set forth in the famous Warren-Brandeis article, The
Right To Privacy," and Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v.
United States."6 They granted that "where political personalities or
issues are involved or where the event . . . is in itself a matter of
current public interest" there should be protection conferred by
Sullivan, but the first amendment did not protect areas outside.
The Life story, the dissenting Justices felt, did not deal with a mat-
ter of public interest; therefore, the state should be hermitted to
offer a remedy.70
The intention of the public speech theory was to reach beyond
the political arena. All areas considered necessary to the public's
understanding and discussion of ideas requires first amendment
protection. By extending protection to Life magazine against an
individual who was thrust unwillingly into the public sector, the
Court incorporated Meiklejohn's first amendment theory, though,
65. "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their period." Id. at 388 (quoting Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. at 102).
66. 385 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 407.
68. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAev. L. REv. 191 (1890).
69. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
70. 385 U.S. at 415 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 33:207
COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
it had not yet completely elaborated on the problem of distinguish-
ing between public and private.
The divisions over the public-private issue were magnified in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.7" In a plurality opinion, Justice
Brennan continued the line of reasoning begun in Sullivan that the
general citizenry had a legitimate and substantial interest in per-
sons other than public officials, and extended his first amendment
argument one step further." "[T]he constitutional protection was
not intended to be limited to matters bearing broadly on issues of
responsible government. '[Tihe Founders . . . felt that a free press
would advance "truth, science, morality, and arts in general" as
well as responsible government.' ,,13 Though this was not to say that
everything was public, he did argue that "we are all 'public' men
to some degree."'" The test became whether the matter was a sub-
ject of public or general interest; a private individual's involvement
did not reduce the public's interest in the event or reduce first
amendment protection.
Justice White, concurring in Rosenbloom, felt that Justice
Brennan had struck too hard at state libel laws and that more solid
first amendment grounds were needed.75 Justice Harlan, as in Time,
Inc. v. Hill, urged the Court to distinguish between privacy rights
and the rights of public figures. This, he said, was an even clearer
case of a private individual and again he emphasized the public
figures' access to media, arguing that a reasonable care standard
should be imposed on the press.
Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued that Justice Brennan had
failed to provide a standard or guidelines to decide what was
"public" or within the area of public or general concern.7 The dis-
71. 403 U.S. 29 (1970).
72. Rosenbloom, the operator of a newstand, was arrested for allegedly selling obscene
material. Following his arrest, a radio station carried reports which characterized Rosenbloom
as a "smut merchant" and "girlie-book peddler." In a defamation suit, Rosenbloom was
awarded $50,000 in punitive damages, later reduced by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court overturned the libel verdict. Id.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbloom, federal and state courts had
extended the Sullivan rule beyond public figures and officials to cover matters of public
interest and concern. See Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Bon Air Hotel,
Inc. v. Time, Inc. 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Bishop v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Fannsworth v.
Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
73. 403 U.S. at 42 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967)
(Harlan, J.)).
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id. at 79.
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sent claimed that the test articulated by Justice Brennan would
have to be considered on a case by case basis, and would result in
unpredictability and uncertainty since courts would be performing
an ad hoc balancing. Justice Marshall thought this method would
threaten both privacy and first amendment principles.
Justice Brennan's test is the appropriate standard to apply in
a copyright problem. With the Meiklejohn approach, the court's
concern should be with the matter copyrighted and not with balanc-
ing the interests represented by copyright and the first amendment.
If a matter is of general public concern and a copyright holder is
limiting access through his copyright, the first amendment should
be a defense to any alleged infringement if someone uses the copy-
righted material.
It is apparent that the Court was split by the problem of public
versus private and it retreated somewhat in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc." from its position in Rosenbloom. The issue the Court consid-
ered was "whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes de-
famatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public
official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege
against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements."78 On
facts similar to Rosenbloom, the Court attempted to eliminate the
confusion.
Justice Powell balanced the interests: the value of self-
censorship of the news media against the state's interest in compen-
sating individuals for the harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
He concluded that the state interest won, thus refusing to extend
the Sullivan rule. The Court held that a different rule should apply
with respect to compensating injury to the reputation of private
individuals. The standard was left to the states provided they did
not impose on the news media a standard of liability without fault.79
77. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz was a reputable attorney retained by a Chicago couple to
represent them in civil litigation against a policeman who had shot and killed their son. The
defendants published the American Opinion, a monthly publication of the John Birch So-
ciety. This magazine focused on what they viewed as a nationwide conspiracy to discredit
local law enforcement agencies and, as part of their continuing effort to alert the public, they
wrote an article on the civil trial entitled: Frame Up: Richard Nuccio and the War on Police,
Am. OPINION (Mar. 1968).
Although Gertz was only remotely connected with the policeman's prosecution, he was
portrayed in the article as the architect of the "frame-up." The article also stated that Gertz
had been a member of an organization that advocated the violent seizure of the government,
and labeled Gertz a "Leninist" and a "Communist fronter." In plaintiff's defamation action,
defendant sought to invoke the privilege enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
78. 418 U.S. at 332.
79. Id. at 347.
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The underlying rationale for the Court's move away from the
Sullivan standard of "malice or reckless disregard" may be ex-
plained by its concern for the private individual. In contrast with a
public figure, who has access to the channels of communication
thereby permitting him to contradict what has been said about him
and, most importantly, who has purposely placed himself in the
public view, the private individual is powerless and unassuming.
Therefore, the private individual is entitled to greater protection.
The Court attempted to clarify the problem by defining "public
figure" in the following standard:
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must ac-
cept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in pub-
lic affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might
otherwise be the case ....
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position.
Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a pub-
lic figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instan-
ces of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles
of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolu-
tion of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention
and comment.0
In Gertz, the Supreme Court permitted states to apply a negligence
standard when considering defamation allegations by those who did
not meet the above criteria.
Justice Brennan argued in Rosenbloom that whether the sub-
ject was a matter of public or general concern should be the applica-
ble test in deciding to apply the Sullivan standard. Justice Powell
considered this test in defining "public figure" but contended that
the "instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceed-
ingly rare." In other words, there may be times when a subject is of
sufficient public or general concern to elevate a private individual
to the level of a public figure. Gertz's involvement in the trial was
not sufficient, according to Justice Powell, though Justice Brennan,
in dissent, argued that on the facts, the publisher of the article
was involved in a matter of public interest and therefore fell within
the Sullivan standard. Justice Powell's opinion was not a rejection
80. Id. at 344-45.
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of Rosenbloom; rather, the Court was focusing on the individual
defamed instead of the event or subject.
This focus on the individual was extended by Justice Rehnquist
in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,8' where he adopted the Gertz standard
to define "public figure." He concluded that Mary Alice Firestone
was not a public figure within the Gertz definition. In reaching his
conclusion he rejected the argument of Time, Inc. that the divorce
proceedings were a "cause celebre," a public controversy, and there-
fore respondent must be considered a public figure. Justice Rehn-
quist refused to equate "public controversy" with all controversies
of public interest. In other words, these particular events were not
sufficient to raise respondent to the level of a public figure.
Justice Rehnquist, in analyzing Alice Firestone's position, first
examined her as an individual and then looked to the event to
determine if she were a public figure. In concluding that Mrs. Fire-
stone was not a public figure, Justice Rehnquist did not reject the
Rosenbloom plurality's test, but he did narrow its scope by refusing
to extend the first amendment to all events of public interest. Thus,
the implication was raised that only certain public controversies
were absolutely protected. What those controversies might be re-
mains an open question.
The underlying access-to-ideas premise of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, taken from Meiklejohn's theory, has remained consis-
tent throughout the cases. The breadth of its application has argua-
bly been reduced in recent years, though it provides absolute protec-
tion, absent malice, against all public figures and public officials.
The matters most concerned with self-government are protected,
though in light of Gertz and Firestone, it might be more difficult to
expand into other areas.
To summarize, the appropriate test to apply to copyright is the
plurality Rosenbloom standard articulated by Justice Brennan.
Constitutional protection should be extended to all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern.2
81. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Respondent, Mary Alice Firestone, married Russell Firestone,
an heir to one of America's wealthiest industrial families. They were separated in 1964, and
subsequently a divorce was filed. The activities of the couple were sufficient for the Circuit
Court of Palm Beach, Florida, to dissolve the marriage. The editorial staff of Time magazine
was alerted to the fact that judgment had been rendered and gathered information from four
sources. On this basis, a small item appeared in the "Milestones" section of the magazine.
One section read: "The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramari-
tal adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.'" Id. at 452.
When Time refused to issue a requested retraction, respondent filed a libel action against
petitioner in the Florida state court.
82. For an excellent discussion of the status of public figures after Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, see Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law of Libel; A Concept in Search of A
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This protection is at the core of the public speech theory and goes
to the heart of the second part of the standard suggested here. First
amendment protection should be a defense against alleged copy-
right infringements where the matter's accessibility has been lim-
ited, and it is a matter of general or public concern.
The Court, in considering private individuals in both Gertz and
Firestone, went through the two-tier process to determine the status
of the individual and the type of protection to be given the publish-
ing entity. The focus was on the individual rather than the event in
which the individual was involved, but the Court still used the
Rosenbloom plurality test in the second part of its analysis. First,
the Court asked if the individual met the definition of public figure;
and second, it examined his activities and asked whether it was a
matter of sufficient public concern to raise the individual to the
level of a public figure.
In Gertz, the Court concluded that the Sullivan rule was in-
applicable because Gertz himself was not a public figure. In
Firestone, Mary Alice Firestone was also held not to be a public
figure. Justice Rehnquist's rejection of the Sullivan rule restricts the
Rosenbloom plurality test, since it limits what is of public interest.
It left intact those interests that are most important to self-
government. What now remains open is the question of what other
matters will be considered of public interest. One may look to the
commercial advertising cases for guidance.
C. The Commercial Advertising Cases
The commercial advertising decisions are further evidence of
the acceptance of the public speech theory as a strong, viable first
amendment rationale. The Supreme Court adopts Meiklejohn's ar-
gument that the government has no authority to determine what its
citizens read or see, regardless of whether it is a political issue vital
to self-government.
The first commercial advertising case to move toward this posi-
tion was Bigelow v. Virginia,3 wherein a Virginia newspaper an-
nounced the availability of abortions in New York. The advertise-
ment was published in violation of a Virginia statute that made it
a misdemeanor for any publication to encourage or prompt the pro-
curing of an abortion. The Court held the statute to be a clear
violation of the newspaper editor's first amendment rights."
Definition, 33 Bus. LAw. 709 (1978). For the various areas where individuals have been found
to be public figures see cases cited in id. app., at 725.
83. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
84. The Court noted:
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Further extension in the commercial advertising area, apart
from political issues, occurred in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,"5 wherein consumers
attacked on first amendment grounds a statute making it a misde-
meanor to advertise prescription drugs. In holding the statute un-
constitutional, the district court initially noted that Valentine v.
Chrestensen,6 which had long been cited for the proposition that
commercial speech does not warrant first amendment protection,
had been tempered by later decisions holding that the first amend-
ment interest of free flow of price information could outweigh the
countervailing interests of health, safety and welfare.
The Court noted that the subject in Bigelow (abortion) was a
matter of "public interest," while here the subject was purely com-
mercial. Nonetheless, the Court extended first amendment protec-
tion recognizing the consumer's interest in such information: "As to
the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day's most urgent political debate. 87 The Court
recognized that even though an individual advertisement is entirely
"commercial," it may be of general public interest, thus making the
link to Bigelow and the Rosenbloom plurality opinion where the
subject matter, as a matter of public or general concern, raised it
to the level of first amendment protection. The focus has returned
to the subject matter, and in this manner the public speech theory
has been extended; access to information of general interest is the
important issue. Whether there is a question of public political con-
cern is now only of minor interest.
The advertisement published in appellant's newspaper did more than simply
propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear "public
interest" ....
Viewed in its entirety, the advertisement conveyed information of potential
interest and value to a diverse audience-not only to readers possibly in need of
the service offered, but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine
interest in the subject matter or law of another state ....
Id. at 822.
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court wrote: "[Tihe guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent 'the censorship of the press
merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential.'" Id. at 150.
Abortion was, and is, an important political issue, and, thus, Bigelow cannot be viewed
as a great extension of the public speech theory. Commercial advertising, however, previously
had been considered outside the first amendment. The Court's opinion here was to encourage
dissemination of information to the public.
85. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
86. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
87. 425 U.S. at 763.
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The first amendment, according to Virginia Pharmacy, offers
protection to all information that the public might use in its deci-
sionmaking process-whether political or economic." Constitution-
ally, it appeared that the first amendment offered protection to any
information that, properly disseminated, would aid the consumer in
making a decision. This contention was so strong that the Court, in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"° extended it to attorney advertis-
ing-a field in which advertising had been tightly circumscribed.
The Court found that a state "disciplinary rule serves to inhibit the
free flow of commercial information and to keep the public in igno-
rance. Because of the possibility, however, that the differences
among professions might bring different constitutional considera-
tions into play, we specifically reserved judgment as to other profes-
sions."9 0
The Court considered the following problems associated with
attorney advertising: (1) the adverse effect on professionalism; (2)
the inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising; (3) the
adverse effect on the administration of justice; (4) the undesirable
economic effects of advertising; (5) the adverse effect of advertising
on the quality of service; and (6) the difficulties of enforcement. It
concluded that the above reasons were insufficient to suppress all
advertising by attorneys, and found the disciplinary rule violative
of the first amendment since "the flow of such information may not
be restrained." 9' 1
The Sullivan and commercial advertising cases indicate that
the "public speech theory" advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn is
an accepted and viable method for the Court to use in handling first
amendment problems in certain areas. These cases are concerned
with information reaching the public-an area of sufficient import
that the Court has guaranteed dissemination by offering first
amendment protection.
D. The Standard Applied
A copyright holder has an exclusive proprietary interest, sub-
88. The Court cited to Meiklejohn, Id. at 765 n.19.
89. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates and his partner O'Steen were attorneys licensed in Ari-
zona. They set up a "legal clinic" to provide services to moderate income groups and, since
they had a low return on their work, they relied on volume to survive. After two years, they
realized that the only way to stay in business was to advertise, which they did in the Arizona
Republic. This violated disciplinary rule 2-101(B) of the Arizona Supreme Court, which
prohibited attorneys from in any way publicizing themselves or their services. 17A Amz. Rv.
STAT. Rule 29(a) (Supp. 1976).
90. 433 U.S. at 365.
91. Id. at 384.
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ject to some exceptions. If the copyright holder through his property
right makes information inaccessible to the public, a court is con-
fronted with the same dilemma considered in the above cases. If the
information is made available by someone other than the copyright
holder, should a subsequent infringement action be upheld, or
should the court permit a first amendment defense? The Supreme
Court has dealt with these considerations in the past. Newspapers
require protection so they can publish without fear of suit. People
are permitted to advertise, disseminating information to the public,
despite state interests and concerns. In each instance, the first
amendment has shifted the balance to favor accessibility of infor-
mation.
Therefore, the rule the courts should apply to a copyright and
first amendment conflict is as follows: An alleged infringer cannot
be held liable for disseminating information when the copyright
holder, through the proprietary right he has obtained, limits access
to information or to matters that are of public or general concern.
In this rule, which is supported by the cases discussed above, first
amendment interests may override copyright considerations. The
rule itself balances copyright interests (including economic and cre-
ative incentives) against the first amendment (rights to speak and
to hear). In the first decision to take such an approach, Judge King
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida wrote: "When the Copyright Act and the First Amendment
both seek the same objective, their future coexistence is easily as-
sured. However, when they operate at cross-purposes, the primacy
of the First Amendment mandates that the Copyright Act be de-
prived of effectuation.""2
It is this author's contention that the above standard provides
a more concrete approach for handling conflicts between copyright
and the first amendment. To demonstrate its validity, it will be
contrasted with the tests developed by two authorities in the copy-
right field, Melville Nimmer and Paul Goldstein.
IV. ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT
A. Melville Nimmer
In several articles"3 and a noted treatise," Melville Nimmer,
92. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 882
(S.D. Fla. 1978).
93. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech
and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1180 (1970); Nimmer, Copyright and the First Amendment,
17 BuLL. CoPYiorr Soc'y 255 (1970).
94. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11.
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recognizing the implicit conflict between copyright and the first
amendment, offers a "definitional balancing" test as a possible sol-
ution. It is a balancing of speech and nonspeech interests to deter-
mine which forms are to be regarded as "speech" within the mean-
ing of the first amendment."5 Nimmer points to New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan" as an example of the Court drawing a definitional line;
some defamatory speech is "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment, while some is not."
In order to apply this approach in copyright, "it is necessary to
draw a line between that speech which may be prohibited under the
copyright ,law, and that speech which, despite its copyright status,
may not be abridged under the command of the first amendment.""
This requires a balancing of the opposing interests because copy-
right grants a limited monopoly to authors on the dual premise that
the public benefits from their creative activities and that such a
monopoly is necessary to stimulate such activities. The reasons for
the first amendment are obvious and represent an important part
of our national ethos. The conflicting interests must be accommo-
dated in a definitional balance. Nimmer writes:
On the copyright side, economic encouragement for creators must
be preserved and the privacy of unpublished works recognized.
Freedom of speech requires the preservation of a meaningful pub-
lic or democratic dialogue, as well as the uses of speech as a safety
valve against violent acts, and as an end itself."
Nimmer's proposed balance is based on the idea-expression
dichotomy. Ideas cannot be protected by copyright; expression of
those ideas can be so protected. Under this definitional balance,
ideas fall on the free speech side of the line while expression, includ-
ing selection and arrangement of ideas, is on the copyright side.
Nimmer argues that the definitional balance is defensible because
ideas are vital elements to a democratic dialogue. Copying the ex-
pression of an idea, however, will not add to the maintenance of the
so-called "democratic dialogue" or the "market-place of ideas."
Thus, copying would fall on the copyright side of the line, and its
prohibition ensures the public benefit that follows from the positive
force to be creative.
Nimmer also considers some situations where the idea-
expression dichotomy fails. One such area is where the expression
95. See id. § 1.10[A], 1-67.
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
97. 1 M. NIMM9R, supra note 11, § 1.10[A], at 1-67.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 1.10[B][I], at 1-72.
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may be far more important than the idea; for example, graphic
works or Nimmer's example of photographs of the My-Lai massa-
cre. 00 Words could not describe the "idea" of the massacre nor
substitute for the public insight gained through the photographs.
Nimmer admits his definitional balance fails, but at the same time
finds it intolerable that the full meaning of My-Lai could be cen-
sored by the copyright holder of the photograph.
. The test proposed herein, however, would simplify analysis and
solution of this problem. Since the photographs are of public inter-
est and concern, were there to be a limitation on their access, the
first amendment interests would out-balance copyright protection.
Another example is the case of Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates, 0' involving the Zapruder home movie films of the John
F. Kennedy assassination. Time, Inc., purchased the films from
Zapruder and properly registered them under the copyright statute.
Time refused to permit Thompson, the author of a book expounding
a theory of the assassination, the use of the film. He managed to
reproduce and then to publish them, and Time brought an action
for infringement of its statutory copyright. Defendants raised the
first amendment as an affirmative defense, but the case was ulti-
mately decided under the doctrine of fair use. 02
The defendant's right to copy was permitted on the grounds
that there was a "public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy.' ' 0 3 Again, Nimmer's
idea-expression dichotomy would fail, while the two-pronged test
advocated herein would produce the desired result.
Nimmer speculates on how to generalize from the My-Lai and
Zapruder film situations, which fall on the free speech side of the
line, to those graphic works that should retain copyright protection.
He points out that "[giraphic works per se should not be deprived
of full copyright protection."'' Nimmer would limit this category of
expression to news photographs. Yet, rather than attempting to
create exceptions and categories, a more reliable test is needed.
There may be other photographs or graphic works besides news
photos that should be accessible to the public. Applying the sug-
gested two-pronged test of limitation on accessibility, with the req-
uisite public interest or concern eliminates the need for artificial
categories. Although the result under the two tests may be the same,
100. Id. § 1.I0[C][21, at 1-82.
101. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
102. Fair use has now become a statutory defense. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977).
103. 293 F. Supp. at 146.
104. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.10[C][2], at 1-83.
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rather than attempting to create arbitrary categories, the courts can
rely on a concrete standard in resolving a conflict between the first
amendment and copyright.
Nimmer also discusses what he considers to be unjustified bal-
ancing in favor of free speech, pointing to Rosemont Enterprises,
Inc. v. Random House, Inc.' His concern is that fair use and the
first amendment will legitimize wholesale amputation in vital copy-
right areas.'" He writes: "Fair use, when properly applied, is limited
to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketa-
bility of the work which is copied. The first amendment privilege,
when appropriate, may be invoked despite the fact that the market-
ability of the copied work is thereby impaired.""' Nimmer chose the
first tack in analyzing Rosemont Enterprises, after concluding that
free speech elements were absent. In that case, Random House pub-
lished Howard Hughes-a Biography, by John Keats. Keats, who
revised an earlier author's manuscript, relied heavily on previously
published newspaper and magazine articles, including articles pub-
lished in Look magazine in 1954, for information on the recluse
millionaire. Three days before the book was published, Rosemont
Enterprises, a Hughes corporation, purchased the copyrights from
Look, advised Random House of its holdings and five days later
brought an action for a preliminary injunction. The facts indicate
that the purchase was intended to prevent access, not only to this
material, but to the book as well. The court reversed the district
court's granting of a preliminary injunction on the grounds of fair
use. Nimmer believes the court wrongly decided the case. It is
argued here that the correct result was reached, though the rationale
should have been based on first amendment grounds.
Nimmer distinguishes Rosemont Enterprises from Geis because
Keats had copied some of the actual expression used in the Look
articles. Returning to his expression-idea dichotomy, Nimmer
argues that the "value of such labor-saving utility is far outweighed
by the copyright interest in encouraging creation by protecting ex-
pression."''0 He would have permitted copying of the ideas, but the
copying of expression took it out of fair use, thus precluding any first
amendment question.
The issue of copying was not central in the case. Look had no
intention of bringing suit for copyright infringement so it is difficult
to accept an argument that the interest in encouraging creation
105. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
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would be hindered, since the creator had no intention to enforce its
rights.
The intention of Rosemont Enterprises in purchasing the copy-
right was to prevent access to information that was of potential
public interest. The court took note of Hughes' notoriety:
By this preliminary injunction, the public is being deprived
of an opportunity to become acquainted with the life of a person
endowed with extraordinary talents . . . . [A] narration . . .
ought to be available to a reading public which, even in an afflu-
ent society, might well be reminded that affluence usually comes
from the work of such entrepeneurs in business and industry.
* . . [W]hen one enters the public arena to the extent that
he has, the right of privacy must be tempered by a countervailing
privilege that the public have some information concerning im-
portant public figures.
' . . [T]he public interest should prevail over the possible
damage to the copyright owner.' 0'
The facts here lend themselves perfectly to the application of
the standard proposed in section 1II. There was an attempt by the
copyright holder to limit access to a subject that was of public
concern and interest. The court recognized this, but only Chief
Judge Lumbard squarely addressed the problem:
The spirit of the first amendment applies to the copyright
laws at least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any
attempted interference with the public's right to be informed
regarding matters of general interest when anyone seeks to use
the copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of
quite a different nature."'
First amendment interests should have outweighed the copy-
right interests in that case. Copyright law does not preclude one
from using and copying portions of an earlier author's work. In other
areas, like statistical studies or cases with actual dialogue, there
might be a need to copy. Nevertheless, where the first amendment
interests are substantial, regardless of whether ideas or expression
is copied, there should be no liability for an alleged copyright in-
fringement.
B. Paul Goldstein
In his oft-quoted article"' on copyright Paul Goldstein ap-
1
109. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d at 309. Note that
Hughes was considered the copyright owner in this instance.
110. Id. at 311 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
111. Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983 (1970).
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proaches the problem quite differently than Nimmer. He begins by
focusing on the factual setting of Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v.
Random House, Inc."2 as a practical setting for his discussion. His
analytical framework is that artistic expression is the subject of two
types of monopoly, "statutory and enterprise.""' The statutory
monopoly is represented by the Rosemont claim that the Look copy-
rights, which were based on compliance with the Copyright Act, had
been infringed. Statutory monopoly involves the tensions between
the Copyright Act and freedom of speech. The enterprise monopoly
is represented by the attempted aggregation of copyrighted articles
devoted to the life of Howard Hughes.
Goldstein's test involves a balancing of the competing interests
of free speech and copyright. He attempts to identify methods for
reconciling the competing interests and develops what he calls ac-
commodative principles, the first of which
requires that copyright infringement be excused if the subject
matter of the infringed material is relevant to the public interest
and the appropriator's use of the material independently ad-
vances the public interest. The second accommodative principle
requires that only "original" literary property be protected
against unauthorized use, that actual damages be demonstrated
by the plaintiff, and that the granting of legal, not equitable,
relief be the general rule when the plaintiff prevails."'
Goldstein's thesis is that a balance must be struck between the
copyright holder's property interest and the public interest. This
balancing, though, should not be necessary for reaching a decision.
The Court has demonstrated that in areas of public concern the first
amendment will generally override any considerations or other in-
terests."5 Generally, the courts need only determine whether the
first amendment is a defense for the infringer: whether access has
been limited by the copyright holder and whether the information
is in the public interest.
Goldstein's major premise is similar to that advocated
here-the challenged use, to be excused, must operate to advance
the public interest."' Goldstein, at the time he wrote his article, was
112. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); see notes 105-110 supra.
113. See Goldstein, supra note 111, at 985-86.
114. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 988.
115. It is recognized that the Court has generally balanced competing interests when it
was considering application of the first amendment in the cases discussed in section IlI of
the text. In every instance where the subject was a matter of public interest, the first amend-
ment prevailed. The courts should simply look to see if the subject of the copyright infringe-
ment is of public concern.
116. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 995.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
limited to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Time, Inc. v. Hill.
The Court, as indicated in section III, has decided several cases
since then and has further defined what it considers to be of "public
interest or concern.""' These cases make it possible to arrive at a
definite standard, as opposed to Goldstein's awkward property anal-
ysis.
His property interest is represented by the misappropriation
doctrine established in International News Service v. Associated
Press."' Goldstein claims there is an affirmative first amendment
rationale for the government's grant of copyright monopolies be-
cause it encourages the creation of works for public dissemination."'
Goldstein's second accommodative principle requires that only
original property be protected from infringement and that an in-
fringement suit lie only when there is actual economic injury. The
Court, in International News Service, focused on these two points.
It gave recognition to the plaintiff's property interest in the collec-
tion of its news releases and found the misappropriation by the
defendant actionable to the extent that it prejudiced plaintiff's eco-
nomic position. Goldstein indicates that the majority's affirmance
of the lower court's injunction was improper, and, as Justice Bran-
deis suggested in his dissent,' the exclusive remedy should have
been merely damages. This represents what Goldstein views as an
acceptable balance between "plaintiffs economic integrity as well
as broad public participation in expression."''
The majority in International News Service, affirmed on the
grounds that plaintiff was entitled to protection of its "right to
acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful busi-
117. See section III A supra.
118. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The Associated Press (AP) had asked for an injunction to
restrain the International News Service from stealing AP news in three ways:
[f]irst, by bribing employees of newspapers published by complainant's mem-
bers to furnish Associated Press news to defendant before publication, for trans-
mission by telegraph and telephone to defendant's clients for publication by
them; second, by inducing Associated Press members to violate its by-laws and
permit defendant to obtain news before publication; and third, by copying news
from bulletin boards and from early editions of complainant's newspapers and
selling this, either bodily or after rewriting it, to defendant's customers.
Id. at 231.
The AP alleged that it cost about $3.5 million annually to gather the news and to
distribute it to its customers and claimed a property right in the news itself. The news matter
was not, of course, copyrighted. The district court granted a preliminary injunction on the
first two counts of the complaint; the court of appeals sustained the injunction. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the AP did, in fact, have a property right. Id. at 237-42.
119. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 995.
120. 248 U.S. at 248-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 999.
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ness.' 12 The Court simply shunted aside any first amendment con-
siderations and viewed the case simply as the misappropriation of
another's labors. Goldstein views it as an accidental but acceptable
example of balancing both property rights and economic interest.
Justice Brandeis, however, recognized the first amendment implica-
tions of the majority's action: "The rule for which the plaintiff con-
tends would effect an important extension of property rights and a
corresponding curtailment of the free use of knowledge and of
ideas."12
About 400 newspapers throughout the country relied exclu-
sively on the International News Service (INS) for news of the war
in Europe. When INS offices were closed by foreign governments,
the readers of those newspapers were suddenly deprived of news of
vital public interest or concern. The net result, therefore, was that
the Associated Press (AP) had limited access of the news to its
customers, though it is doubtful whether the AP was actually
harmed by the actions of INS, since AP customers still had to pay
for the news bulletins that AP distributed. In fact, the AP member
newspapers were probably delighted to see its competition without
the important news from Europe. In this context, the first amend-
ment guaranties of the public's right to know would far outweigh
any property rights under the standard advocated here.
After presenting his analytical framework, Goldstein discusses
the various permitted uses of copyrighted material-statutory per-
mission,'2 14 fair use' 5 and, the most important, private standing to
assert the public interest.' 26 Goldstein points out that a court allow-
ing a fair use defense permits the user's isolated economic interest
to prevail in order to broaden public access to expression. The in-
fringer is thereby given standing to assert that public interest. The
test, in the context of the second accommodative principle,
"requires that the accused infringer be exonerated if he can demon-
strate that the property used by him is the object of a compelling
public interest and, at the same time, that its sacrifice will not
unduly prejudice the copyright owner.' ' 27
122. 248 U.S. at 236.
123. 248 U.S. at 263. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 1010.
125. Id. at 1011. See also section II supra.
126. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 1014.
127. Id. at 1015. The method of the second accommodative principle is to distinguish in
any protected work those components which are the subject of a compelling public interest
from those whose protection create economic incentive in the author. This critical distinction
is maintained internally by the statutory requirement that only original works may be copy-
righted and is externally manifested in the requirement that the copyright interest be thor-
oughly elastic. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 1016.
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This test is objectionable on two grounds. First, the most recent
cases evince a broadening perspective of public interest and
"compelling" should not be a criterion. Second, the copyright
owner's economic considerations are irrelevant if he is limiting ac-
cess to the information. If he has not limited access, the infringer's
use should not be permitted with the 'copyright holder recovering
damages equal to the economic benefit gained by the user. If access
to information has been limited by the copyright owner, even
though the infringer may cause some economic harm, there should
be no liability.'28
Goldstein defines elasticity to mean "that as the legitimacy of
the public interest in participation increases, so the property inter-
est protected by copyright ought correspondingly to diminish."'1'
The framework of his elasticity doctrine is the idea-expression di-
chotomy. It is apparent from Nimmer's discussion that there are
serious shortcomings with this doctrine. This is particularly disturb-
ing since both authors are using it to determine the extent of copy-
right protection. Ideas cannot be protected, but the expression of
those ideas can be protected, and "the more an idea assumes expres-
sive proportions the more extensive is the right accorded it."'' 3
Again, how should one treat photographs or other works of art?
Goldstein's theory is based on a balancing of the copyright interests
against the first amendment. In setting up his framework, he bal-
ances property rights and economic incentives against the interest
of the public in gaining access to information. Determining the ex-
tent of the property interest depends in the end on the outcome of
the idea-expression dichotomy. A court, therefore, must make a
series of value judgments and balancings to reach a conclusion. As
with Nimmer's framework, the idea-expression dichotomy would
not adequately satisfy all situations. Therefore, a more acceptable
test is the standard proposed here and supported by recent decisions
discussed below.
C. The Recent Decisions
Meeropol v. Nizer131 and Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-
Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 32 are two recent cases that offer the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate the weaknesses and strengths of the stan-
128. This final category would probably be included in the new statutory definition of
fair use. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977).
129. Goldstein, supra note 111, at 1016.
130. Id. at 1018.
131. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
132. 445F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
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dards of analysis for first amendment and copyright problems.
In Meeropol, plaintiffs were the natural children of Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 after conviction for
conspiring to transmit United States defense secrets to the Soviet
Union. Louis Nizer, their attorney, wrote The Implosion
Conspiracy, an account of the events surrounding the Rosenberg
trial. The book contained verbatim portions of twenty-eight copy-
righted letters written by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Since Nizer
had obtained no authorization, use of the letters constituted the
alleged copyright infringement on both statutory and common law
grounds.
The district court in Meeropol granted summary judgment for
defendants based on a fair use defense.13 The court of appeals,
however, reversed, finding that fair use could not be found as a
matter of law and that factual questions were at issue."'
The court of appeals listed a four factors framework within
which it would analyze whether the use was a fair one: (1) the
purpose and character of the use (scholarly or commercial); (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the work used;
and (4) the effect of the use on the potential market of the copy-
righted material. 31 The court focused on the fourth factor in its
reversal of summary judgment. A key factual issue remained as to
whether the publication of twenty-year old letters in The Implosion
Conspiracy prejudiced the plaintiffs' potential market in the let-
ters. 3
The Meeropol case is an interesting example of how, alterna-
tively, the first amendment would constitute a complete defense to
the alleged copyright infringement. Application of the various tests
advocated in this comment could offer some insight as to the role
of each in an actual conflict.
First, it should be established that the Rosenbergs were unques-
tionably public figures since their trial was the subject of public
interest, and their letters would presumably be of equal interest.
Second, the letters had been out of print for twenty years and,
arguably, their accessibility was limited. For the purposes of discus-
sion, assume that authorization had been requested and denied by
the children.
Under Nimmer's test, the idea-expression dichotomy, personal
letters would provide an exception. The expression in the letters
133. Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
134. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
135. Id. at 1069.
136. Id. at 1070.
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(requiring verbatim copying), as opposed to the ideas, would be
essential to their effectiveness. A court would then have to balance
access against the economic incentives of copyright, probably re-
quiring difficult factfinding procedures. Thus, the idea-expression
definitional balancing test would be cumbersome, at best.
Goldstein's test, which also focuses on the idea-expression rela-
tionship, requires the object in dispute to be of compelling public
interest, while not unduly prejudicing the copyright owner. The
court would largely be repeating the various balancing tests dis-
cussed above. There would be some question as to whether these
letters or events, twenty-five years after they had occurred, would
be considered compelling. Also, because of the concern of the eco-
nomic interests, there would again have to be a determination and
factfinding on any possible economic damage.
Under the standard proposed herein, resolution of the case
would be relatively easy and unburdened by uncertain balancing
tests. Two threshold determinations would be made. First, plain-
tiff's refusal to permit the use of letters that have been out of print
would constitute limitation on access. Second, the historical signifi-
cance of the letters would constitute a matter of public interest. "7
With these first amendment criteria satisfied, the intrinsic eco-
nomic claim in copyright need not be considered.
The property right question may be ignored in this particular
instance because the plaintiffs were using the copyright laws in a
manner inconsistant with the policy underlying those laws in that
they were attempting to prevent the dissemination of matter impor-
tant to the public interest. The purpose of copyright is to provide
economic incentives to the creators of original works. Copyright
enables the Rosenberg children to use the historically significant
letters in a commercially beneficial fashion, but not necessarily to
cut off their availability to the public. Therefore, since it may be
argued that the plaintiffs' withholding of the letters from the public
was in contradiction to the policy of the copyright laws to provide
economic incentives, this incentive structure would not be upset by
a successful first amendment defense.
Triangle Publications was the first case to be decided using the
first amendment as the legal rationale for finding no infringement
of a copyright.3 1 The defendant was Knight-Ridder. One of its news-
137. A right to privacy issue will often coincide with the determination of what is a
matter of public interest. For a discussion of the court's rejection of the privacy claim in
Meeropol, see 560 F.2d at 1066-68.
138. Judge King recognized this by noting: "This case presents an issue of first impres-
sion in this nation." 445 F. Supp. at 876.
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papers, The Miami Herald, had developed a new supplement for its
Sunday editions, a so-called T.V. book, containing listings for the
week's television shows together with articles related to television
programming. Triangle Publications, meanwhile, was publisher of
the highly visible and successful TV Guide, which exhibited a simi-
lar format and was sold at newsstands. The Herald, in promoting
its new supplement, used the technique of comparative television
advertising. In one commercial feature, the commercial visually
identified the competing product, TV Guide, for a few seconds, and
urged the viewer to purchase the Sunday Herald television supple-
ment instead. Plaintiff complained that defendant utilized a copy-
righted item without plaintiff's permission and sought an injunc-
tion. A preliminary injunction was dismissed and, following the
discussion of three issues, the permanent injunction was denied as
well.3
In its defense, the Herald argued that fair use, as embodied in
the new copyright law that was barely a month old, was designed
to permit criticism, literary or otherwise, of a work submitted for
public consumption. The court found that case law compelled the
conclusion that the criticism exception was developed for literary
and cinematic reviews-not commercial critiques that appear in
everyday television advertisements."
The court relied on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,' the legal
advertising case which extended first amendment protection to
commercial speech. Since the plaintiff in Triangle Publications
sought to enjoin a form of speech by use of copyright, there arose
again a fundamental conflict between copyright and the first
amendment."'
Judge King's analysis paralleled the standard suggested in sec-
tion III. He rejected plaintiffs economic arguments that the Act was
designed to protect the creator's work from all "deleterious competi-
tive effects."" 3 Judge King pointed out that the authors of the Act
139. The threshold issue, not discussed within this comment, was whether a magazine
cover is protected under a copyright granted to the creator of the magazine. See 445 F. Supp.
at 878-79. The court held that the cover could, in fact, be protected. Id.
140. Id. at 879-81.
141. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
142. Judge King, in considering comparative advertising, wrote:
The comparative advertising at issue here was clearly undertaken to inform the
public that they should purchase the Miami Herald TV supplement rather than
buy TV Guide because it provides more value for the money. Such comparative
advertising, when undertaken in the serious manner that defendant did herein,
represents an important source of information for the education of consumers in
a free enterprise system.
445 F. Supp. at 883.
143. Id. (quoting 23 A.L.R.3d 139, 190 (1967)).
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
did not center on the disadvantage which arises from the per-
ceived commercial superiority of a product . . . .Rather, the
deleterious effect which the Act seeks to avert is that which ac-
companies the reproduction, by another, of "so much of the origi-
nal. . . as will materially reduce the demand for the original due
to the demand having been partially satisfied by the alleged in-
fringing production.''
The court refused to enjoin defendant's activity, a decision Judge
King believed assures the coexistence of the Act and the first
amendment.14 1
The decision is of great importance since this was the first court
to accept the first amendment as an overriding consideration when
there was a conflict with the copyright clause.'" Judge King uti-
lized, though not expressly, the standard urged by this comment.
He recognized the public's interest in this type of advertising and
used the same line of cases discussed earlier to support the first
amendment propositions. Furthermore, he recognized that, in es-
sence, TV Guide was attempting to use its copyright to limit access
to the discussion of the product.
The Herald did not reproduce or in any way use any material
copyrighted by TV Guide, except in the comparison of covers. The
problem of access, therefore, was slightly different than has been
previously discussed. We still see, however, an attempt by the
holder of the property right to limit access to information, presuma-
bly to prevent any kind of comparative advertising. Finally, Judge
King rejected any kind of economic argument. The economic injury
that was urged is also somewhat at odds with that discussed earlier.
Emphasis was nonetheless placed on the first amendment when it
was decided that its guaranteed interests are more important. Judge
King had, through Bates, ostensibly applied the public speech
theory of the first amendment to a pure copyright case."7
144. Id. (quoting 23 A.L.R.3d 139, 190 n.10 (1967)).
145. 445 F. Supp. at 884.
146. Though the court rejected defendant's argument that the use of the cover was fair
use, it appears to this author that there were solid grounds for making such an argument.
The case is at present on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
and it is possible that a fair use argument will be accepted.
147. Melville Nimmer was retained by T.V. Guide to aid in writing the brief and in
arguing the case before the Fifth Circuit. Briefs have been filed and oral argument is pending.
Nimmer, in appellant's brief, argues that the idea-expression dichotomy represents "not
only a principle of copyright law, but demarcates the thrust of the First Amendment in the
copyright sphere." He also adds that the courts have uniformly upheld the idea-expression
dichotomy. See Brief for Appellant at 15. In support of this proposition, Nimmer cites recent
decisions by the Ninth and Second Circuits as well as a brief footnote in a 1977 Supreme
Court case. Nimmer continues that the test he has suggested is the most appropriate and that
therefore the district court decided the case wrongly. Of course, the purpose of this comment
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V. CONCLUSION
This comment advocates a rule whereby the first amendment
is a defense to an allegation of copyright infringement. Although
simple in its operation, the rule simultaneously protects the inter-
ests of the general public, and considers the interests of the copyright
is to demonstrate that the standard developed here is more appropriate and, as the text
indicates, the Triangle case was decided correctly.
The first case Nimmer cites, see Brief for Appellant at 16, is Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit cites
Nimmer's law review article, Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guar-
antees of Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1180 (1970), as authority and argues
that the Supreme Court has not considered the impact of the first amendment on copyright
because the idea-expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing inter-
ests. 562 F.2d at 1170. That court was considering the competing interests in the context of a
McDonald's advertising campaign using characters from a children's television show to sell
a product. There is admittedly no public interest here and the first amendment defense does
not survive. There is genuine public interest, however, involved in comparative advertising
and use of the copyright to prevent that should not override the first amendment interests.
Nimmer also cites Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977). Brief for Appellant at 17. Wainwright Securities is an institutional research and
brokerage firm that produces in-depth analytical reports for private subscribers. The Wall
Street Transcript Corp. reproduced parts of the reports without permission, which precipi-
tated a copyright infringement suit. The Second Circuit, in denying a first amendment
defense, cited with approval the idea-expression dichotomy. The court, however, distin-
guished the problem before it from a decision on the first amendment limitation of copyright
when dealing with matters of general concern. This is an important distinction and would
affect the use of the proposition to support a decision in Triangle Publications.
The standard proposed herein leads to the same result reached by the Second Circuit in
Wainwright. Wainwright Securities did not limit access to its material through use of copy-
right. It would also be difficult to determine that the material was a matter of public interest
or concern. Certainly this test would permit the courts to reach more easily this conclusion
rather than to attempt to decide if material is similar or dissimilar.
Finally, Nimmer suggests that a footnote in the Supreme Court's decision of Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), indicates Supreme Court endorse-
ment of the idea-expression dichotomy. The case revolves around an Ohio law concerning the
"right of publicity." Copyright is mentioned only in passing and the footnote he cites does
not mention the idea-expression dichotomy. The footnote does note
that Federal District Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to the
federal copyright law on the ground that "no restraint [has been] placed on the
use of an idea or concept." United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D.
Okla. 1974). See also Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108,
115-16 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The First
Amendment Guaranteees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180
(1970), who argues that copyright law does not abridge the First Amendment
because it does not restrain the communication of ideas or concepts).
433 U.S. at 577 n.13. This was hardly an endorsement of the idea-expression dichotomy and
certainly not a setting from which one could draw such a conclusion.
The courts may tentatively have accepted the idea-expression dichotomy, but that may
be explained two ways. First, the courts have not been presented with an alternative, and
second, there have been few instances, if any, where the issue has been placed squarely before
them. This comment has offered that alternative and has demonstrated how it posits a more
effective solution to copyright and first amendment conflicts than the idea-expression dichot-
omy.
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holder. He is penalized only if he attempts to limit access to his
work by use of his copyright. His commercial and economic interests
are protected if he disseminates his work; so long as economic incen-
tives remain, the incentive to create will endure as well. The first
amendment defense, therefore, does not undermine the copyright
interests unless the copyright holder abuses his rights.
The scope of copyright protection is further considered in that
only subjects of public or general concern must be made accessible
to the public. If a copyright holder does not wish to disseminate that
which would be considered private information, and such informa-
tion is made accessible by an infringer, the infringer could not claim
a defense of first amendment. The first amendment defense, how-
ever, must be upheld when an alleged infringer makes accessible
information that is of public or general concern.
Since the test proposed here properly protects the copyright
interests and the public's first amendment interests, the Act and
the first amendment can certainly co-exist. In certain situations,
however, the rights of a private copyright holder must be subordi-
nated to the more vital and far-reaching demands of the first
amendment.
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